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IN SEARCH OF JUSTICE:
TORTS CONFLICTS OF LAW
HARVEY COUCH*t
While complete agreement on proper outcomes m choice-of-
law questions is not always possible, there is a lack of consensus
regarding conflicts issues today that is disconcerting. Persua-
sive law review articles appear, but authors disagree over solu-
tions.1 Courts decide choice-of-law questions, but one suspects
that such decisions are based on a judicial sixth sense rather
than a consistent methodology 2
If certainty, predictability and uniformity of result are ap-
propriate goals in conflicts, as they are m other areas of the law,
then general areas of agreement need to be identified and ex-
panded.
By no means is everything bleak; great progress has been
made m the last two decades. A series of essays by Brainerd
Currie introduced a more rational approach to choice-of-law
problems.3 Currie called for the identification and analysis of
the relevant governmental interests of each state. If no interest
could be found, there would be no reason to apply that state's
law.' His methodology resulted in a refreshing honesty; public
* B.A. 1959, Hendnx College; M.A. 1962, LL.B. 1963, Vanderbilt University; Pro-
fessor, Tulane University School of Law.
t The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments and suggestions of
Donald T. Trautman.
1. E.g., compare articles cited note 15 infra with articles cited note 16 mnfra.
2. For the New York experience, see Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d
519, 249 N.E.2d 394 (1969); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591, 221
N.E.2d 380 (1966); Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792
(1965); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
3. See generally B. CURRI, SELECTE D ESSAYS ON THE CoNFLICr OF LAws (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Cumn]. In some respects, Currie built on the theories of Cook
and Cavers. See W COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws
(1947); Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REv. 173 (1933-
1934).
4. CuRm, supra note 3, at 188-282.
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policy, whicli previously had been used only as a last resort,
became a controlling consideration under Currie's analysis. 5
Virtually all conflicts writers accepted Currie's analysis, albeit
with individual variations. The courts were slower with such
acceptance, though many have now adopted some form of in-
terest analysis.8
It soon became clear however that, at best, Currie's method
offered merely a frame of reference. It was discovered that
using Currie's formula, interests could be manipulated or fabri-
cated to fit the party's needs.7 Currie's solution in so-called true
conflict cases8 was to apply the law of the forum. This solution
was not wholly satisfactory since it reflected an admittedly
"give-it-up" attitude9 and encouraged the prospect of forum-
shopping. Most conflicts writers, on the other hand, agree that
normative principles operating independently of the chosen
forum should be utilized in conflicts analysis.' 0 Another diffi-
culty with Currie's analysis arose with the "unprovided for
case."" For example, in a wrongful death action, if plaintiff
and plaintiff's decedent are from a state with a $50,000 limita-
tion on recovery for wrongful death and defendant is from a
state imposing no such limitation, neither state can be said to
have an interest to advance, since the policy of plaintiff's state
is to protect defendants from outlandish, emotion-ridden judg-
ments and the policy of defendant's state is to afford plaintiffs
full recovery for their loss. How, then, would interest analysis
5. "[W]hy not summon public policy from the reserves and place it in the front
line where it belongs?" Id. at 88 (footnote omitted).
6. Louisiana, for example, had adhered to the traditional approach as late as 1970,
but adopted a modem approach to choice of law in 1973. Couch, Louisiana Adopts
Interest Analysis: Applause and Some Observations, 49 TuL. L. REV. 1 (1974-1975).
7. Compare Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792
(1965) with Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 249 N.E.2d 394 (1969).
8. A "true conflicts" case exists where more than one state has a legitimate interest
in having its law applied to the issue, and the laws of these states conflict. Bernhard
v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
9. CURRm, supra note 3, at 121.
10. "Predictability of results includes the ideal that the decision in litigation on a
given set of facts should be the same regardless of where the litigation occurs, so that
forum-shopping will benefit neither party." R. LEFLAR, AmmucAN CoNFLcTs LAw 245
(1968) [hereinafter cited as LEFLA]. Professor Trautman has urged the pursuit of
"neutral principles that apply equally to like cases." Trautman, Rule or Reason in
Choice of Law: A Comment on Neumeier, 1 VT. L. Rav. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Trautman].
11. An "unprovided for case" arises when neither state has an interest to advance.
Cumux, supra note 3, at 152-53.
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cope with such a case?"
There were, at least implicitly, two other criticisms of the
Currie analysis: (1) Except for the domicile of the parties,
rather short shrift was given to territorial contacts or to where
an event was centered and (2) Currie's vision was too narrowly
focused on specific or local policies of a state without sufficient
consideration of general or multistate policies. 13
These two criticisms seem to have spawned, however inad-
vertently and indirectly, two of the principal factions in choice
of law today. In delineating these two groups there is, of course,
the risk of oversimplification. Perhaps, however, for the pur-
pose of facilitating discussion, some generalization is permissi-
ble. One group has been referred to as "the new territorial-
ists."1 Professors Cavers, Reese and Twerski are representative
of this group." This is not to suggest that these writers would
12. For Currie's suggestions, see CuRmE, supra note 3, at 152-56; for a more recent
attempt to cope, see Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided For Case: Reflec-
tions on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HoFsTRA L. REv. 125 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Sedler]. Professor Twerski may exaggerate when he says "that interest analysis met
its Waterloo with the advent of the unprovided for case." Twerski, Neumeier v. Kueh-
ner: Where are the Emperor's Clothes?, 1 HoFSTA L. REV. 104, 107 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Twerski].
13. Currie acknowledged this latter criticism:
I have been told that I give insufficient recognition to governmental policies
other than those that are expressed in specific statutes and rules: the policy of
promoting a general legal order, that of fostering amicable relations with other
states, that of vindicating reasonable expectations, and so on. If this is so, it is
not, I hope, because of a provincial lack of appreciation of the worth of those
ideals, but because of a felt necessity to emphasize the obstacles that the present
system interposes to any intelligent approach to the problem. Let us first clear
away the apparatus that creates false problems and obscures the nature of the
real ones.
CuRR, supra note 3, at 186-87.
14. R. CRAMTON, D. CuRRm & H. KAY, CoNmacr OF LAws 339 (2d ed. 1975).
15. D. CAvEns, THE CHoIcE-oF-LAw PRocEss 139-80 (1965); Cavers, Cipolla and
Conflicts Justice, 9 DUQ. L. Ray. 360 (1970-1971) [hereinafter cited as Cavers,
Conflicts Justice]; Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEx. L. Rav. 211
(1970-1971) [hereinafter cited as Cavers, Principled Preferences]; Reese, Chief Judge
Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. Ray. 548 (1971); Reese, Choice of Law: Rules
or Approach, 57 CoRNu. L. REv. 315 (1971-1972) [hereinafter cited as Reese, Choice
of Laiw]; Reese, The Kentucky Approach to Choice of Law: A Critique, 61 KY. L.J.
368 (1972-1973) [hereinafter cited as Reese, The Kentucky Approach]; Twerski,
Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Cavers - The Pennsylvania Method, 9 DuQ.
L. Rav. 373 (1970-1971) [hereinafter cited as Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism];
Twerski, supra note 12.
This list, of course, is not exhaustive, and other writers and judges might be in-
cluded. Those included have done a fair amount of influential writing. Among the
judges that might be mentioned are Chief Judges Fuld and Breitel. See their opinions
in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972).
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always agree on a given result; indeed, their approaches differ
in some measure. What they have in common is the view that
territorial contacts must be given weight in conflicts analysis.
In the search for some workable guidelines to be used in resolv-
ing choice-of-law problems, these writers refuse to ignore the
territorial aspects of the case. The second group might be
called "multistaters," and would include, among others, Pro-
fessors von Mehren, Trautman and Hancock."6 Again, their
analyses are not interchangeable, but they do share the tend-
ency to discuss conflicts cases without any significant regard
for the territorial setting beyond the identification of concerned
jurisdictions. To resolve a conflict in competing local policies,
these writers seek an accommodation by looking to national or
multistate policies that overarch the concerned states. Such
policies might include, for example, easing the judicial task;
encouraging the free flow of interstate transactions; even-
handedness; the better, or emerging, rule of law and, in tort
cases, compensation and deterrence.
Assuming that these roughly defined factions do represent
two distinct approaches in choice of law today, there are never-
theless many outcomes upon which the two groups would agree
and some cases, fewer in number, about which they may never
agree. This premise can be illustrated through an analysis of
some well-known cases. Conflicts scholars agree, for example,
that Grant v. McAuliffe"t and Haumschild v. Continental Cas-
ualty Co.1 8 reached the right result, though using a now out-
16. A. VON MEHREN & D. TRArTMmN, Tim LAw OF MULTISTATE PRosLEMS 215-327
(1965); Hancock, Some Choice-of-Law Problems Posed by Antiguest Statutes: Realism
in Wisconsin and Rule-Fetishism in New York, 27 STAN. L. REv. 775 (1974-1975)
[hereinafter cited at Hancock]; Trautman, supra note 10; von Mehren, Recent Trends
in Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CoRNm L. REv. 927 (1974-1975) [hereinafter cited
as von Mebren, Recent Trends]; von Mebren, Special Substantive Rules for Multi-
state Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law
Methodology, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 347 (1974-1975).
Again, there are other writers who should be mentioned. Professor Leflar's well-
known "choice-influencing considerations," for example, embrace multistate consider-
ations and do not include any territorial elements. LEnLM, supra note 10, at 233-65.
The prolific Professor Sedler is an admitted "anti-territorialist." Sedler, The Terri-
torial Imperative: Automobile Accidents and the Significance of a State Line, 9 DuQ.
L. REv. 394 (1970-1971). Luther L. McDougal, who is developing a complex methodol-
ogy essentially based on multistate policies, or "inclusive interests," as he describes
them, should also be mentioned. McDougal, Choice of Law: Prologue to a Viable
Interest-Analysis Theory, 51 TUL. L. Rxv. 207 (1977).
17. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953).
18. 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
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dated methodology. 19 In Grant, two California residents were
involved in a collision in Arizona. The alleged tortfeasor subse-
quently died and suit was filed against his estate in California.
Under Arizona law, a cause of action in tort did not survive the
death of a tortfeasor, while California, on the other hand, had
a survival statute. The policy behind the Arizona law was to
protect the family and heirs of the tortfeasors; California took
the view that an injured plaintiff should not be deprived of
compensation by the death of the tortfeasor. In Grant, Califor-
nia had an interest in advancing its policy to protect the Cali-
fornia plaintiff. Since the family and heirs of the tortfeasor
were also California residents, Arizona had no interest in
applying its law. In such a case, there would be agreement that
California law should apply even though the accident occurred
in Arizona.2°
In Haumschild, a Wisconsin couple was involved in an acci-
dent in California. After returning to Wisconsin, the wife filed
suit against the husband and his insurer. California, but not
Wisconsin, had the doctrine of interspousal immunity. Califor-
nia's policy was to preserve family harmony and prevent collu-
sive suits; Wisconsin's policy was to provide financial protec-
tion to injured plaintiffs without making an exception in the
husband-wife situation. Since this case involved a Wisconsin
family and Wisconsin insurer, California had no interest in
applying its law and clearly the only sensible reference was to
the law of Wisconsin.2 1 Since only one state, in each of the two
cases, had an interest in having its law applied, these cases are
classic false conflicts. 22 Certainly both multistaters and territo-
19. The methodology used was the characterization of an issue in such a way so as
to avoid or escape the application of another state's laws that normally would apply.
Id. at 140, 95 N.W.2d at 819.
20. The California Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Traynor, applied Cal-
ifornia law by characterizing survival statutes as remedial and therefore more proce-
dural than substantive; the forum, of course, applies its own procedural law. 41 Cal.
2d at , 264 P.2d at 948-49. Subsequently, Traynor admitted the opinion was not
"ideally articulated." Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Tsx. L. Rza. 657,
670 n.35 (1958-1959).
21. The Wisconsin Supreme Court applied Wisconsin law by characterizing the
issue as one of family law, which should be governed by the law of the family domicile,
rather than tort law. 7 Wis. 2d at 136-37, 95 N.W.2d at 817-18.
22. In Wisconsin, a false conflict occurs when two or more states have legitimate
interests in having their laws applied, but the competing laws do not conflict. There-
fore, it makes no real difference which state's law is applied. See Hunker v. Royal
Indem. Co., 57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468,
19781
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rialists would approve the indicated results.23 Grant and
Haumschild are not only false conflicts, they are easy cases in
which the result is obvious.
Unfortunately, however, the two groups may not always
agree on cases labeled false conflicts. For example, in Tooker
v. Lopez,2" two New Yorkers were full-time students at Michi-
gan State University. While there, they decided to take a week-
end trip to Detroit in a car insured in New York and owned by
the father of one of them. There was an accident resulting in
the death of the two students. Subsequently, in New York, the
representative of the guest-passenger filed suit against the fa-
ther of the host-driver. Michigan had a guest statute, reflecting
a policy of attempting to reduce the potential for collusive suits
against the host's insurer. New York did not have a guest stat-
ute, indicating the view that the general policy of compensat-
ing persons injured through the ordinary negligence of another
should not be subordinated in the guest-host situation. Here,
New York had an interest in protecting the New York plaintiff
and since there was a New York insurer, Michigan had no
interest in applying the guest statute. Thus, under interest
analysis, this was a false conflict and New York law should
govern." Multistaters would agree: New York represents the
better, or emergent, rule of law and affords greater financial
protection to the injured party. Territorialists, however, are
troubled by this result:" the parties were, in effect, residents
of Michigan, the guest-host relationship was formed there, the
trip was to begin and end in Michigan and the tragic accident
occurred there. These are numerous and weighty contacts with
157 N.W.2d 579 (1968). The Wisconsin terminology accords with the view of Professor
leflar. Leflar, True "False Conflicts, " Et Alia, 48 B.U.L. Rav. 164, 169-74 (1968).
23. Conflicts scholars in both camps accept interest analysis generally as a starting
point. The exception is Professor Twerski, who wrote: "I am only advocating territori-
alism as a normal operating principle. We can and will provide for the throwout and
will do so honestly, reflecting the teaching of the interest analysis. But, the base rule
should be a territorial one." Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism, supra note 15, at 382-
83. Twerski would surely characterize Grant and Haumschild as "throwout" cases.
24. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 249 N.E.2d 394 (1969).
25. This was the view of Judge Keating writing for the majority in Tooker. See
Sedler, supra note 12, at 126.
26. Twersld, supra note 12, at 123. Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism, supra note
15, at 379-85. Cavers has conceded, at least, that the result in Tooker is "a bit odd"
and a "bit quixotic." Cavers, Conflicts Justice, supra note 15, at 369-70; Cavers,
Principled Preferences, supra note 15, at 218. See Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262
N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965), and Professor Cavers' approval of that result.
D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PRocEss 293-312 (1965).
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Michigan. Here the territorial elements pull strongly away
from the state that is presumably the only interested state.
While there will be exceptions like Tooker, multistaters and
territorialists agree on the resolution of most false conflict
cases. Some measure of agreement can also be reached on more
difficult, or true conflict, cases. To continue with the familiar
guest-host setting, the formula for a true conflict in such a
situation is a plaintiff-guest from a state without a guest stat-
ute (state A) and a defendant-host from a state with a guest
statute (state B). State A seeks to assure compensation to an
injured plaintiff for the ordinary negligence of the defendant
and state B protects the host's insurer from collusive suits. If
the host enters state A and there forms the guest-host rela-
tionship with the guest for a trip to state B and an accident
occurs in A, all would agree that A law should apply to the
guest-host issue. All the territorial contacts are in A and the
application of A law results in the application of the better, or
emerging, rule of law; imposes the higher standard of care;
allocates the risk of loss to the wrongdoer and advances the
multistate policies of compensation and deterrence. Thus, uti-
lization of A law will satisfy both choice-of-law analyses.Y As-
sume, however, that the guest enters state B and there forms
the guest-host relationship with the host for a trip to state A
and an accident occurs in B.2 Territorialists would elect to
apply the guest statute of state B29 because the event is cen-
tered in B, the parties would expect B law to govern and it
would unfairly surprise the host to be subjected to A law when
he has had no contact with state A other than in giving a ride
to a resident of A. The multistaters would, however, apply A
law because the territorial contacts are essentially irrelevant,
A law is the better rule, A law more properly allocates the risk
of loss and A law advances the general policies of compensation
27. If multistaters would apply the law of A when the case is centered in B, see
note 30 and accompanying text infra, they would obviously do so here. Since the case
here is centered in A, territorialista would apply A law. See Cavers, Conflicts Justice,
supra note 15, at 366-67; Twerksi, Enlightened Territorialism, supra note 15, at 388-
90.
28. This is the case of Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970). The
case is the subject of a symposium in 9 DuQ. L. REV. 347 (1970-1971).
29. Cavers, Conflicts Justice, supra note 15; Twerski, Enlightened Territorialism,
supra note 15.
30. See Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, , 267 A.2d 854, 857-62 (1970) (Rob-
erts, J., dissenting); Hancock, supra note 16, at 783-84.
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and deterrence common to both states. Here, a stalemate is
reached; in fact, there may never be complete agreement.
The same results occur upon examination of an
"unprovided for case." Under interest analysis, Neumeier v.
Kuehner is such a case. Consideration might first be given to
a variation on the actual facts: a resident of Ontario is tempo-
rarily in New York where he receives a ride with a New York
resident for a trip within New York. There is an accident injur-
ing the Ontario guest, and the guest then files suit against his
New York host. Ontario has a guest statute protecting the
host's insurer; New York does not, protecting instead the in-
jured plaintiff. Thus, neither state has a real interest in ad-
vancing its policy. Territorialists would have no trouble in
applying New York law because the negligent conduct and the
injury occurred in New York, the guest-host relationship is
centered there and the defendant is domiciled there. Multi-
staters would agree with this result since application of New
York law advances New York's general interest in compensa-
tion and is the better rule of law.
In Neumeier, however, the facts were reversed. A New
Yorker drove into Ontario, picked up an Ontario resident for a
trip within Ontario and the accident occurred in Ontario. Since
the accident, injury, relationship and trip all occurred within
Ontario, territorialists (including, in this case, Chief Judge
Fuld) called for the application of the Ontario guest statute,
with the probable result of denying recovery to the plaintiff."
Multistaters, however, would view the place of the accident
and the seat of the relationship as essentially fortuitous or irrel-
evant and would urge application of New York law3 since it is
the better, or emergent, law, it advances, the policies of both
states in compensation and deterrence and it results in even-
handed justice.3 '
If the results predicted in the foregoing cases are essentially
31. 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972). The case is the subject
of a symposium in 1 HoFSTRA L. Rav. 93 (1973).
32. E.g., Twerski, supra note 12.
33. Hancock, supra note 16, at 785-87; Sedler, supra note 12; Trautman, supra note
10.
34. That is, if the New York host had injured a New York guest in Ontario, then
New York law would apply; there is no rational basis for disciminating against an
Ontario guest by not applying the more generous New York law. This argument for
evenhandedness is well made in Trautman, supra note 10, at 16-20. See also Hancock,
supra note 16, at 786.
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accurate, certain propositions can be deduced. There is agree-
ment as to the applicable law in the easy, indisputably false
conflicts. With regard to closer cases, there is also agreement
when the territorial center of a case is in the state providing the
greater degree of financial protection to the injured plaintiff.
Disagreement arises, however, when the case is territorially
centered in the state providing a lesser degree of financial pro-
tection. These areas of disagreement will continue since territo-
rialists speak of predictability, expectations and unfair surprise
and refuse to countenance an approach that seems to be di-
rected toward getting the insurer" while multistaters urge that
the most rational means of solving the dilemma posed by tough
cases is in looking to general, shared policies of the concerned
jurisdictions." There is, however, some area of agreement that
should be solidified. For example, there is concurrence that the
purpose of choice of law is to achieve conflicts justice. 7 This
view recognizes that the goals of predictability, certainty and
uniformity of result have merit and that a system which does
not require every choice-of-law case to be appealed to the state
supreme court is desirable. 8 Therefore, although there must be
room for flexibility, it would seem that if choice of law is to
have a minimal amount of predictability there must be at least
a few widely accepted rules.
35. Professor Cavers has warned against
application of whichever law imposes the greater liability on the defendant's
insurer. Some may applaud this as frankly realistic, but to me this preference
seems unprincipled. I cling to the notion that a liability insurer is liable only if
and to the extent the insured is liable. A preference disregarding that contrac-
tual relationship does not seem to me to be choosing between competing laws:
It is sticking the insurance company.
Cavers, Principled Preferences, supra note 15, at 219-20 (footnotes omitted).
36. See generally articles cited note 16 supra.
37. See Cavers, Conflicts Justice, supra note 15. For the term, conflicts justice,
Cavers acknowledged his indebtedness to Professor Gerhard Kegel of the University
of Cologne. Id. at 360 n.2. Conflicts justice may differ from perfect justice, but as
Professor Reese has said, "Perfection is not for this world." Reese, Choice of Law, supra
note 15, at 322. Another scholar has said:
While I would not want to be understood as saying that a bad rule is better than
no rule at all, I do assert that a choice-of-law rule need not achieve perfect
justice every time it is invoked in order to be preferable to the no-rule approach.
Rosenberg, Comment on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Rzv. 641, 644 (1967-1968)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenberg].
38. Courts "should not be asked to concern themselves with multitudes of fine-
spun issues and problems merely because we conflicts men insist on hand-tailored,
case-by-case, take-it-all-the-way-to-the-Supreme-Court-every-time justice." Rosen-
berg, Conflict of Laws Round Table, 49 TEx. L. Ray. 229, 230 (1970-1971).
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The first Restatement of Conflicts9 and its reporter, Profes-
sor Beale, 4° attempted to create rules for solving all the permu-
tations involved in conflicts cases. As Beale and the Restate-
ment have come under heavy and successful attack,41 rules
have taken on a negative connotation in modern choice-of-law
thinking because they conjure up visions of an uncompromising
rigidity and narrow-mindedness. This, of course, is a greatly
exaggerated view and many conflicts writers acknowledge the
advantage of having some rules, though obviously there may be
disagreement over the number and scope. 2 If, however, the
discussion of territorialists and multistaters has any validity,
then the points of agreement between the two can lead to a few
narrowly drawn principles.
It is clear that in order to pass examination by territorialists
and multistaters, any rule must be narrowly and carefully
drawn. The problems presented by broader principles can be
illustrated by considering the rules suggested by Chief Judge
Fuld for resolving guest statute cases.4 Fuld's first rule pro-
vides: "When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are dom-
iciled in the same state, and the car is there registered, the law
of that state should control and determine the standard of care
which the host owes to his guest."44 This rule reaches Babcock
v. Jackson,5 and to that extent would be approved by all schol-
39. RESTATEMENT OF CoNFar OF LAwS (1934).
40. See generally J. BEAL, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAwS (1935).
41. Virtually every conflicts writer has taken shots at Beale and the first Restate-
ment. See generally W. CooK, THE LOGICAL AN LEGAL BASEs OF THE CoNrCT LAWS
(1947). Of Cook's writings, Brainerd Currie said, "Walter Wheeler Cook discredited
...[Beale's] theory as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever discredit the
intellectual product of another." Cum, supra note 3, at 6 (footnote omitted).
42. Some years ago, when an approach or method was the fashion, Professor Rosen-
berg valiantly argued for the need for rules. Rosenberg, supra note 37. Professor Cavers
has long urged the use, if not of rules, at least of principles of preference. D. CAvms,
THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PRocESS 114-224 (1965). Professor Reese says we may now be ready
to formulate a few rules. Reese, Choice of Law, supra note 15. The desire for rules is
not limited to territorialists; while multistaters may feel that we are not yet ready for
rules, Professor Trautman has observed that "neutral principles that apply equally to
like cases" are "ultimately indispensable to law." Trautman, supra note 10. Professor
von Mehren has noted that, "In the administration of justice, rules are psychologically
attractive and of considerable practical advantage." von Mehren, Recent Trends,
supra note 16, at 965.
43. Fuld's rules were incorporated in the majority opinion in Neumeier v. Kuehner,
31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972), but were first set out in Tooker
v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 249 N.E.2d 394 (1969).
44. 24 N.Y.2d at 585, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 532, 249 N.E.2d at 404 (concurring opinion).
45. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963).
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ars and judges, at least those who have adopted a modem
approach to choice of law. In Babcock, a New York guest and
New York host left New York and an accident occurred while
they were temporarily in Ontario. This is a classic false conflict
and only a traditionalist adhering to a rigid "place of wrong"' 6
rule would urge application of Ontario's guest statute. How-
ever, Fuld's rule is too broad to be acceptable to either territori-
alists or multistaters. The former might be disturbed by the
result the rule would prescribe in a case like Tooker v. Lopez"
where none of the immediate territorial contacts are centered
in the state of common domicile. At the same time, multi-
staters might reject the result required by Fuld's rule in a case
where the guest and host are domiciled in a state with a guest
statute, but the accident occurs in a state without a guest
statute." Here it is the state of the accident and not the com-
mon domicile that has the better rule of law which provides
financial protection to injured plaintiffs and to possible medi-
cal creditors in the accident state. Thus, to receive general
approval, Fuld's first rule would have to be qualified to read
something like this:
When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled
in the same state, and the car is there registered, the law of
that state should control and determine the standard of care
which the host owes to his guest, provided the guest-host
relationship is formed in that state, or the accident occurs
there, and provided further, that the domiciliary state im-
poses the higher standard of care or greater financial protec-
tion against injury."
The foregoing is a rule that would be acceptable to everyone.
Fuld's second rule presupposes, in effect, a true conflict: the
46. "Place of wrong" rule is now almost completely discredited but was the tradi-
tional rule of torts espoused in the first Restatement of Conflicts. It provided that the
determination of the existence and extent of tort liability is made according to the law
of the place of the "wrong." RESTATEMENT OF CoNFrcT OF LAws § 384 (1934).
47. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 249 N.E.2d 394 (1969). See notes 24-26 and
accompanying text supra.
48. See Hancock, supra note 16, at 779-83; Trautman, Two Views on Kell v. Hen-
derson: A Comment, 67 COLUM. L. Rxv. 465 (1967). Cases applying the law of the
accident state (no guest statute) though both the guest and host are domiciled in a
state with a guest statute are Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408
(1973); Kell v. Henderson, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966); Conldin v.
Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968).
49. The wording of the last phrase is from Cavers. Cavers, Principled Preferences,
supra note 15, at 217. See also D. CAVERS, THE CHOIcE-OF-LAw PRocass 139-66 (1965).
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host-driver from a state with a guest statute, the guest-
passenger from a state without a guest statute. Fuld, disclosing
a territorialist bias, would here refer to the place of the accident
as a means of resolving the conflict. 0 This solution is not ac-
ceptable to either of our delineated factions. When the host-
driver has an accident in his home state (having a guest stat-
ute), the multistaters are not prepared to apply the host's law. 1
In such a case, territorialists are more likely to acquiesce in the
rule's application, but they might reject the result it requires
in a case like Foster v. Leggett." There, though the host-driver
had the accident in his home state (which had a guest statute),
he worked in the guest's home state, spent several nights a
week there, the pertinent guest-host relationship was formed
there and the trip was to begin and end there. Thus, in Foster
the case was territorially centered in a state other than the
place of the accident." In such a case, even territorialists would
object to Fuld's second rule since it makes the choice turn on
only one territorial contact: the place of the accident.
Fuld's third rule, in part, provides: "In other situations,
when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different
states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the
applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the
accident occurred . . ... "I The "other situation" envisioned
here is the unprovided for case: the guest from a state affording
protection to the host's insurer and the host from a state which
protects the injured guest. Fuld suggests a presumptive refer-
ence to the law of the place of the accident. Again, this would
encounter dual objection. Multistaters would object because
use of the rule may result in application of a law (e.g., a guest
statute) which represents an outdated, exceptional rule, and
which subordinates the general policy (common to all states)
50. Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 585, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 532, 249 N.E.2d 394,
404 (1969) (concurring opinion).
51. See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
52. 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972). The case is the subject of a symposium in 61 KY.
L.J. 367 (1972-1973).
53. Carets, in his fourth principle, would refer to the state that is the seat of the
guest-host relationship. D. CAvERs, THE CHOIcE-oF-LAw PRocEss 166 (1965). However,
Reese would, very hesitantly, go along with Fuld's rule and apply the guest statute of
the accident state. Reese, The Kentucky Approach, supra note 15, at 373. See also
Twerski, To Where Does One Attach the Horses?, 61 Ky. L.J. 393 (1972-1973).
54. Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 585, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 533, 249 N.E.2d 394,
404 (1969) (concurring opinion).
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of compensating persons injured through the negligence of an-
other;55 territorialists would object to the exclusive reference to
the place of the accident."
This brief review of Fuld's rules underscores what was said
earlier: generally speaking, agreement can be reached when
territorial contacts and compensation coincide. However, there
is likely to be disagreement when the case is centered territori-
ally in a state where recovery would be limited or denied. Per-
haps the issue can be put in the form of a question: will the
basic, multistate policy of compensation eventually overrun
virtually all territorial considerations. An affirmative answer
may already be evolving."
It is not an easy question. The contention is persuasive that
in tort cases, recovery for injuries caused by the negligence of
another is the norm and inhibitions to recovery are the excep-
tion and therefore, a defendant should lose these protections
when he is involved in a multistate transaction. It is also gener-
ally true that restrictions on recovery, such as guest statutes,
immunities and dollar limitations, are out of favor and decreas-
ing in number." In addition, since a judge has a freedom in a
55. See notes 33, 34 and accompanying text supra. The articles cited therein are
all critical of Fuld's rules.
56. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
57. Professor Reese has observed:
In this day of widespread insurance, however, the policy of providing compensa-
tion for the victim enjoys increasing importance, and the time may come when
it is recognized that this is the basic policy underlying at least the area of
unintentional torts. Indeed, it may be noteworthy that the great majority of the
recent choice of law decisions involving unintentional tortious injuries have
applied a law favorable to plaintiff. It may be, in other words, that the policy
favoring compensation is already sub silentio at work. In any event, the time
may come when the policy will play an important role in the formulation of
precise choice of law rules for torts.
Reese, Choice of Law, supra note 15, at 333. As an illustration, seventeen cases are
cited in the present article; the law favoring the plaintiff was applied in thirteen of
them. Of the four exceptions, one, Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463,
209 N.E.2d 792 (1965), has been effectively overruled by Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d
569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 249 N.E.2d 394 (1969); in another, Hunker v. Royal Indem. Co.,
57 Wis. 2d 588, 204 N.W.2d 897 (1973), the plaintiff did at least recover workmen's
compensation though denied additional tort recovery; the other two cases, Neumeier
v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 286 N.E.2d 454 (1972), and Cipolla v.
Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970), have been much discussed, in part, be-
cause the law favoring plaintiff was not applied.
58. See, e.g., "Since . . .[1961], a number of states have repealed their wrongful
death limitations or increased the amounts so that at the present time there are only
seven which have an outright limit. . . ." Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438, 445 (2d
Cir. 1973). "No American state has newly adopted a guest statute for many years.
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choice-of-law case not present in a wholly domestic case, is it
not proper that his creativity be exercised to fashion choice-of-
law decisions giving effect to general principles of compensa-
tion and recognized trends in the law? And yet, this judicial
freedom reduces the likelihood of gaining predictability and
certainty. Multistaters speak of general policies of compensa-
tion common to both states, but when one state has expressly
decided in a given situation to subordinate that general policy
to a specific policy of restriction, should that judgment be so
lightly dismissed? Finally, can territorial contacts really be
deemed irrelevant and thereby disregarded? When a defendant
acts entirely within his home state and in the process causes
injury to an out-of-state plaintiff, is it fit and proper to apply
the law of the plaintiff's state?59 To do so will likely afford full
recovery to the plaintiff, but whether conflicts justice is
achieved is doubtful.
In choice-of-law problems, seemingly insoluble areas of dis-
agreement are present. However, there are some areas of agree-
ment from which some principles may be drawn. This article
has been an attempt to identify both some areas of discord and
of harmony in the hope that such a discussion may lead to
greater harmony and hence to greater certainty and predicta-
bility in conflicts cases.
Courts of states which did adopt them are today construing them much more narrowly,
evidencing their dissatisfaction with them." Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, -, 222
A.2d 205, 210 (1966).
59. Two cases applying the plaintiff's law in such a situation and allowing full
recovery are: Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973); Foster v. Maldonado,
315 F. Supp. 1179 (D.N.J. 1970). The latter case is described as "deplorable" in Cavers,
Conflicts Justice, supra note 15, at 364.
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